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1.1 
IN TI-IE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSE KLAFT.A, l 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Ys. Case No. 
( 10275 
ALBERT N. S~lITH, dba OX 
RANCH, ) 
Dcfe11dr111f r11ul AJJpellr111t. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMIN.ARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. 
All italics are ours. 
FACTS 
It was undisputed that the Black Angus cow in 
question \\ ns owned by defendant, and that it had falleu 
011t of tlte baC'k end of defendant\ truck while in 
transit. The reason wa~ that the back e11d of th~ ruck 
had somehow opened at the corner. Trooper Neil ~. 
Bishop testified as to a cmn-ersation with defendant :it 
the scene of the accident (It 19) : 
"\Vell, he explaiued aboul traveliug 01: ea1r 
and a car causing him to lune his attention di· 
rected to the rear of his truck, or at least to some 
concern for his unit, that caused him to .-;top a1 1il 
inspect his trnck, and he <lid fiud that thn·e 11a1 
eattle missiug, and that there was an opeu111g 
in the coruer; that he was very coneerned, he 11110 
his boy both. They t11rned around. They fastened 
the corner and turned around aml came back tu 
locate and help with what may have occmred. 
Q. In regard to the ownership of this black cmr 
that you observed off the road. did you talk ' 
to him about that? 
.A. Yes. Three years of this is a little 1 ague. I 
do recall that he said it was his, and that he 
was on his way to Ogden from his ranch 111 
Nevada." 
The accident happened on the main highway be· 
tween Salt Lake City and ,;v endover, l' tah, approxi· 
ma tely 4<3 miles east of "r en dover ( R 12) . Trooper 
Bishop described the highway as "what we call black· 
top highway." He also stated (R. 14): 
"Yes, it would be dark. It has been chipped 




of your new-laid hot mix, which tenlls to ahsor11 
mo~t all of your headli1zhts. There woulri hnrc 
' '' . ~ f'CT been some reflection from the ch1ppeu sur a 
· The that would be-that \Vas there at the tnne. 
main color, of course, would he dark" 
The color of the highway was described by plaintiff 
as "the highway seemed awful dark, too" ( R. 45). The 
black cow appeared to Hichard Klafta, plaintiff's son 
rn<l the driver of the automobile, as a black object that 
Jouked like part of the highway ( R. 7 5). The cow was 
described as black by the various witnesses who later 
arrired at the scene .... After the accident, Richard Klafta 
discorered the Cox automobile which had previously hit 
the cow ( R. Ti'). It was on the left-hand side of the 
higlnrar, facing west. with the left side of the car com-
pletely off the road, and "maybe the right front and 
nght rear tire could haYe been on the road," with the 
hea<llighis and taillights off. Trooper Bishop examined 
the Cox ,-ehicle and testified that contact had been lost 
11ith the battery so that the headlights and taillights 
11m not fonctiouing ( R. 4-1). 
Richard l~lat'ta had dri,·en the automobile in ques-
tion from Cicero, Illiuois, pursuant to an agreement 
he had entered into "ith Cathay's Drive-A-,Vay that 
he was tu driYe the automobile to Sacramento in ex-
<'hange for the ride ( H. 71, 72). His mother and father 
made the trip to haYe a final visit with their son before 
he went nYerseas on duty with the Army. Richard 
testified that immediately prior to the accident he was 
trareliug approximately .50 miles per hour (R. 75). He 
testified that lw and his parents left the U nexcelled 
Hrstauraut at sundown and drove continuously to the 
icene of tlw aeeident ( H. H) . The accident happened 
:it fi:il:J p.rn. to () :35 p.111. ( R. 7 5). Defendant prove<l by 
Exhibit n ( R. 129) that 011 the night in question sun-
down was at 5 :08 p.m. at Salt Lake City, Utah. Defend-
ant testified that the distance from the c·uexcellcd 
Restaurant to the scene of the accident is 65 miles, wit/1 
the only restricted speed area being Grantsville, whieh , 
is 4 miles in length, with a BO-miles-per-hour speed li1Uit. 
.Mathematical calculation reveals without dispute that 
Richard drove a distance of 65 miles, includiug .J< mi!e.1 
of a restricted speed zone area, in from one hour and ~5 
minutes to one hour and '27 minutes. Richard testified 
that prior to the accident, he had dimmed his lights on 
account of headlights appearing in the distance; that all 
of a sudden, he noticed the black cow which had the 
appearance of a black tarpaulin on the highway aud 
immediately hit the brakes ( R. 7 5, 76). The investiga· 
tion of Trooper Bishop showed 9 feet 8 inches of skirl 
marks prior to impact. 
Donald E. Green, a P.I..E.. driver, produced b)· 
defendant as a witness, described seeing the Klafta head· 
lights when he was possibly two to three hundred yards 
away and observed the lights suddenly jump into the 
air three or four feet and then violently swene to thP 
right side of the highway (R. 120, 121). 
Implicit in this testimony is the fact that Green did 
not see what made the headlights jump. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TIUAL COURT PROPERLY OR-
DEHED A NE\Y TIUAL ON DAMAGES 
OXLY. 
A. AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANT VIOLATED 
SECTION 27-1-33, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
The court submitted a special verdict for the jury 
to an,wer, and the jury answered as follows: 
"\\' c the jury tind from a preponderance of 
the e\·idence in this case the following answers 
to questions propounded to us: 
l. Did the defrnd:rnt Yiolate the statute here in 
question by failing to properly secure the live-
stock to prevent their escape? 
Answer: (Yes or no) No. 
:.!. \\'as the defendant's violation of the statute 
a proximate cause of the plaintiff's ll1JUries 
and damage~ 
Awmel': (Yes or no) Yes. 
a. \Vhat amount of damages, if any, do you find 
the plaintiff is entitled to as reasonable com-
pensation for her injmies and damage? 
Special $1,333.96. 
General $ None. 
-!. Was the driver. Richard Klafta, guilty of neg-
ligence immediate}~· prior to the collision here 
in question? 
An~w<'r: (Yes or no) Yes. 
5. 'Vas the. negligence of Richard Klafta !lit 
sole proximate cause of the collision? 
Answer: (Yes or uo) No. 
Dated and signed this 16th day of De1.:ember, 
1964. 
.1 s/ Donald 'V. N ortl: 
.Jury Foremau" 
Plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury a1 
a matter of law that defendant was responsible to plain· 
tiff in damages and therefore that the only issue for the 
jury to decide was the issue of damages (see Requested 
Instruction No. 2). In the alternati,·e, plaintiff requestrd 
the court to instruct the jury as a matter of la1r that 
defendant violated Sections 27-1-33 and 27-1-34, Vtah 
Code Annotated, 1953, in allowing cattle to fall from 
his truck; and that if the jury found from a preponder· 
ance of the evidence that said violation proximate!) 
caused damages to plaintiff, then the jury should find 
the issues in favor of plaintiff and against defendant 
and assess damages in accordance with the instrnctions 
(see Requested Instruction No. 3) . 
The court ref used both of these requests and sub· 
mitted the case to the jury on the question as to whether 
or not the defendant had violated the aforesaid statutes; 
and if so, whether or not said violation proximate])· 
caused damages to the plaintiff. (See Instructions 8 
and 9.) In addition, the court submitted to the j tll')' tht 
question as to whether or not Richard IOafta "as guilt) 
of negligence and whether or not said negligence. if anr 
"a' tile ~ok proxinwte cause of plaintiff's injuries awl 
d:unages (see l 11structiou No. I 0) . 
,After the n:r<liet had beeu ordered entered, plaintiff 
11101e<l the court for a judgment N .0. V ., and a new 
trial on the damage issue alone, and the court entered 
Ilic folloll'ing order 011 December 3, 1964: 
'"ln this matter the evidence shows without 
dispute that tlie animal inrnked in the collision 
here in questiou had escaped from the vehicle 
of the defendant.-;. The court is of the opinion 
that Section :27-1-33, C.C.A., 1953, was violated 
by the escape of the animal in question. Under 
the pro,·isions of Section 27-1-34, U.C.A., 1953, 
tlw plaiutiff is entitled to recoYer her damages. 
The motion of the plaintiff for judgment not-
withstanding the ,·erdict is granted. 
"A nc\\· trial is granted on the issue of plain-
tiff\ damages." 
111 plaintiffs argument IJefore the trial judge, plain-
tiff assertetl that the jury should not have been given 
the (1uestio11 of whether or not defendant violated the 
statute. inasmuch as according to the undisputed evi-
dence. Jefenda11t violated said statute; that in addition, 
as a matter of law, the ,·iolation of the statute was a 
proximate cause of injuries to plaintiff and therefore 
the only proper issue for the jury was that of damages. 
The eourt agreed with plaintiff's contentions. 
lt should be pointed out that the interrogatories on 
li:t!1ility were all answered favorably to plaintiff except 
for the first one where the jury· stated that there was 
.., 
I 
no statutory violation. ln the question appeared llit 
words "properly secure the livestock." These arc not 
the words of the statute. The words of the statute are: 
"So ... loaded as to prevent its contents from dropping 
... etc." The incorrect language in the iuterrogatorr 
no doubt accounts for the answer which is. of cours;. 
contrary to the undisputed evidence that Smit!i\ cm: 
fell from his truck. The answer that the violation of the 
statute proximately caused the plaintiff's inj my is cor-
rect and the only proper answer in view of the undis-
puted evidence. The answer that Richard Klafta 11as 
negligent is disputable, but that answer becomes w1-
important in ,·iew of the answer that said negligence 1 
was not the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. 
The answers on damages were improper because of 
failure to assess general damages, even though it was 
undisputed that plaintiff had suffered a fractured back. 
It is clear that under these circumstances, the trial court 
could best correct the situatiou by using its authority 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by granting 
judgment for plaintiff N.0.V. and a new trial on 
damages only. (See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 59.) 
Section ~7-1-33, Utah Corle Annotated, l!l5a, reads 
as follows: 
" (a) No vehicle shall be driven or moved on any i 
highway unless such vehicle is so construct· ' 
eel or loaded as to prevent its content~ from 
droppiny, sifting, leaking, or othm1se es· 
cnpiny therefrom. except that sand 01 
s 
other abrasin:s mar UC dropped for the 
purpose of securing traction or water or 
other suustance may be sprinkled 011 a 
rnadway iu cleaning or maintaining such 
roadway . 
.. ( b) No person shall operate on the highway 
any vehicle ,,·ith any load unless said load 
and any coYeriug thereon is suitably fas-
teued, scrnred and confined according to 
the nature of such load so as to prevent 
said covering or load from becoming loose, 
detached, or in an.lJ manner a hazard to 
other users oi' the highway. (Italics ours). 
The language of the aforesaid statute is mandatory 
:•nd all-indusiYe. The statute simply provides that no 
rebide will be driveu on a highway in the State of Utah 
unless its load is secured so as to prevent any dropping 
lll' escaping of the contents, and further that no person 
.1hall operate a vehicle unless the load is secured and 
tonfined so as to prevent a hazard to users of the high-
11ar Obviously the legislature of the State of Utah had 
111 mind the wry danger which existed in this case of 
trarelers ou the highway being injured as a result of 
dropped objects. Defendaut argues that he should be 
permitted to excuse himself from his violation of this 
1tatute by showing what a careful person he is and hm.,.· 
frequently he inspected his load and ~·hat a sturdy truck 
and rac:k he operated. No such excuse is available to the 
i defendant, whether it be in a suit for damages or a 
trimi11al prosecution. This type of statute is what is 
termed in eriminal law a police regulation. It is stated 
111 Rurrli('k Law of Crime. Yol. I, page 166: 
9 
"The legislature may deem certain acts al-
though not ordinarily criminal i11 themselres 
harmful to public safety, health, morals, a:Hl th; 
general welfare, awl by ,·irtue of its police .IJOll'er 
may absolutely prohibit them, either expresslr. 
or impliedly by omitting all references to ~u~h 
terms as 'knowingly,' 'wilfully,' 'i11tentio11alh-: 
and the like. Su eh statutes are in the nature '11r 
police regulations, aud it is well establishe1l that 
the legislature may, for the protection of all 
the people, punish their violation without regard 
to the question of guilty knowledge. Among the 
illustrations of such statutes are selling adul-
terated or impure food and milk; selling intoxi· 
eating liquors to minors; selling narcotics and 
other harmful drugs; selling oleomargarine for 
butter; removing timber from school lands; pub-
lic officers expending public money in excess of 
appropriation; possession of automobile with 
serial number removed; and manv forms of traf-
fic laws. · 
"It is of ten said bv the courts in connection 
with these cases that the legislature may provide 
a penalty for the doing of a particular act 're· 
gardless of the lack of any criminal intent.' But 
rnluntary action is present in all punisha_ble 
offenses, and the true explanation for holdmg 
responsible violators of the statutes we are now 
considering is that the legislature, for the protec· 
tion of the public, intended that ignorance of the 
fact or state of thin(}' conkmplaterl hv the stntute 
should be no excuse~ The legisl:iture ·makes it th~ 
duty of the individual to know the facts, and '.! 
he acts without such knowledge he does so at.hrs 
own risk. His neglect to ascertain the f:irts fur· 
nishes all the 'intent' the law requires." 
10 
Burdick, Law of Crime, Vol. I, Page 240: 
"The legislature, by virtue of its police power 
may absolutely prohibit certain acts <leerned 
harmful to public safety, health, morals, and the 
ge11eral welfare. Such acts are, largely, in the 
i1ature of police regulations, and the acts prohib-
ited are of tell called 'public welfare otf enses.' 
Sul.'.h terms a.~ 'knowingly,' 'intentionally,' 'wil-
fully,' are usuall:1· omitted from these statutes, 
and it is generally held that since such laws are 
passed for the protection of the public, the legis-
lature intended that ignorance of the fact men-
tio11ecl bv the statute <>houlcl be no defense. It is 
tlw dut,: of the iudiYidual to know the facts, and 
his 11eg
0
leet to ascertain the facts, if he violates 
the law, fumishe'i all the intent the law requires. 
Couspicuous ;imong these statutes are various 
motor-Yehicle awl other traffic acts; pure food 
regulations; and l ir1 uor and anti-narcotic acts." 
This ('omt has already accepted the doctrine of 
:1Lsolule liability in the fields of statutory Yiolation in 
adulleratcd foods and the storing of explosiYes. In the 
ease of Xicmr11111 «.Grand Central Markets,Inc., 9 U.2d 
JU, 837 P.:!d J:!J, this court held that violation of the 
:Hlulteratcd food statutes in selling ground beef with 
trichinae treated absolute liability and stated at page 51: 
.. Prior interpretations of this type statute ha Ye 
stated that ciYil l iabilit\· is based 011 the same 
c:lements as criminal liabilitv and mav be based 
simplr on proof of Yiolatir;n of sucl; a statute 
a1ul violation ma~· re.-;ult e\·e11 though there be no 
kilo\\ kclgc of tlie food's harmful propensities 011 
tl1c part uf those responsible for its sale." 
11 
And again at page .52: 
"Evidence was receiYed in the court below of 
the car~ taken to avoid ~he mixing of grouuJ 
pork with ground beef m the preparation of 
hamburger. This was admissible to show that 
there was no such mixing. But if there was in fact 
such a mixing, then under the statute the defend-
ant is liable. The purpose and eff e<.:t of the in· 
struction was to point out to the jury thi~ fact 
and to make it clear that the evidence of great 
care in the preparation of these products was ad· 
missible only to show that the food was in fad 
not adulterated, and that it should not be con-
sidered by the jury so as to exonerate the defend-
ant from liability on the ground of due care." 
This court in effect applied the doctrine of absolute 
liability in regard to violation of statutes regulating the 
storage of explosives in the cases of Skerl v. Willow 
Creek Coal Co., ( 1937) 92 U.474, 69 P.2d .502, and 
Smith v. Mine~ Smelter Supply Co., (1907) 82 U.21, 
88 P. 683. 
B. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER PURSUANT 
TO SECTION 27-1-34, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
Defendant in his brief is attempting to argue the 
concept of negligence in this case by twisting plaintiffs 
argument around and making it appear that plaintilt 
is contending that a violation of the statute is negligence 
per se. This is not our position. The negligence concept 
is not applicable in the case at bar. Violation of the 
statute proximately causing damages to plaiutiff estnli-
12 
lishes liability pursuant to the specific terms of Sectio11 
~i-1-34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The case at bar 
iseren stronger than the Niemann case, inasmuch as we 
need look 110 further than the terms of the statute itself 
to Jind legislative intent to establish absolute liability. 
Section i7-l-34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as 
follows: 
"Any person ,-iolating any of the provisions 
of this chapter '*"'H• shall be liable for all damages 
that may accrue to the party damaged by reason 
of such violation." 
It is difficult to see how anything could be more 
dear thau that the legislature established absolute lia-
bility for breach of the statute in question. 
According to the clear terms of Sections 27 -1-33 
and ~7-1-34, it was improper for the court to have given 
the jury the question of whether or not defendant vio-
lated the statute. Defendant admitted that his cow fell 
out of the spaee between the tailgate and the side of 
the rack on his truck. Therefore, his violation was 
established. It was improper to invite the jury to strug-
gle over the question of whether or not the def end ant 
iiolated the statute by "failing to properly secure the 
liYestoek to prevent their escape." The cow was not 
secured under the statute because the undisputed evi-
rlenee reYealed that the cow was not prevented from 
·.··dropping ... or otherwise escaping ... " from the 
truek. The word "properly" placed in the court's in-
'1ructions injected a negligence concept not contained 
13 
in the statute. This is the reason the trial court enlenrl / 
judgment for plaintiff N.O. \'.,and the primar~' reason 1 
defendant\; intermediate appeal must fail. 
POINT II 
IN VIE\\' OF THE FACT THAT PLAl:i- : 
TIFF IS ENTITLED TO A DIRECTED 
VERDICT ON LIABILITY AND A XE\\ 
TRIAL ON DA.MAGES ONLY, THE OTHER 
POINTS RAISED BY DEFENDANT IN HIS 
BRIEF ARE vVITHOUT MERIT. 
Before addressing ourseh-es to the individual points 
raised in defendant's brief, we point out that any error> 
in submission of the liability issue to the jury, in order 
to have a bearing on this petition, must have been pre 
j udieial. There could be no prejudice here berause of 
the overriding fact that plaintiff was entitled to a 
directed verdict under the mandatory provisions of the 
Ctah Statutes and the fact that the prone emr in the 
road clearly and as a matter of law was at least one uf 
the proximate causes of the accident. 
OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT RICHARD KLAFTA'S 
CONDUCT COULD HAVE BEEN A SUPERSEDING OR THE 
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
The case of Nyman v. Cedar City, ( 1961) 12 l'2<l 
±.5, :Jo 1 P .2d ll 14, should dispose of defendant's clnini 
that negligence of Richard Klafta was the sole proxi· 
l 
111atc cause of plaintitf's injuries. The court at page 50, 
iu dealing with the question of whether or not the later 
11e1l'Jio·ence of the driver was the sole proximate cause I'> I'> 
instead of a concurring cause, states: 
"A circumstance or a force which can reason-
ably be regarded as the effective factor in pro-
ducing au injury can properly be regarded as a 
proximate cause of it. And this is so even though 
later events which combined to cause the injury 
may also be classified as negligent so long as the 
later act is something which might reasonably 
be expected to follow in the natural sequence of 
events. (Citing Hillyard v. Utah By-Products 
Co., I U.2d 143, 263 P.2d 287.) 
"\Ve are in accord with the idea that where 
there is a negligently created condition (such as 
this obstruction) and a later negligent actor (such 
as the driver) obse1Te<l, or the circumstances are 
sucl1 that he could not fail to observe such ob-
strnction, that he nevertheless ran into it, the 
later negligenee of the driver would be an in-
dependent, inte1Tening, efficient cause, and there-
fore the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
This i.~ based 011 the reasoning that generally 
it is not reasonabh· to be foreseen that one who 
becomes aware of~; danger in ample time to avoid 
it will fail to do so. 
"But a different principle applies if the later 
actor (the driwr ~Talton), even though acting 
negligently, did not become aware of the danger 
until too late to amid striking the obstruction. 
After getting into such an emergency situation, 
his aetion in dri\·ing into the obstruction could be 
regarded as acting in combination with the prior 
15 
negligence of the city as a coucurriug pruxi 11 wte 
cause of the accident. In that event, his act would 
not be the sole proximate cause. Jt is reasoned 
that this is so because the condition of danger 
created by the city is such that it could rcasonablr 
be anticipated that travelers on the street. ne•,,Ji. 1 
gent or otherwise, may not observe the danger~111 
condition until too late to ~n-oid it. Therefore. ;111 
accident of the character here under consideratio11 
might be expected to follow as a natural co11Se-
quence of the dangerous eondition preriouslr 
created, and consequently may be deemed to b~ 
proximately caused by it. The evidence here is 
reasonably susceptible of the vie\\' that the driver 
was unable to see the obstructiou uutil too latr 
to amid it. In fact, that is the import of tlw plain-
tiff's evidence and the theory upon which the 
trial court rendered its judgment." 
Plaintiff's evidence in the case at bar, ju'il as i11 
1 
the Nyman case, showed that the driver was unable to , 
see the carcass in time to avoid hitting it. There is 1111 
evidence whatsoever that he observed or that he could 
not fail to observe such obstruction but ne,·erthclcss ran 
into it. Accordingly, any negligence on the part of Rich· 
ard Klafta could be no more than a concurring cause 
and therefore the defense of sole proximate cause does 
not apply. 
Defendant's violation of the statute is a proximak 
eatfse of the injuries suffered by plaintiff. The rery 
danger that the statute guards against, the danger 111 
other motorists, occasioned by the dropping of ob,iecli 
on the highway, caused the accident in question. 
16 
OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE PLEADINCS 
ALLEGING CAUSAL NEGLECT ON COX'S PART SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED IN EVIDENCE OR MENTIONED 
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS. 
Counsel for plaintiff did not allege in the com-
plaint that Cox's conduet was the sole proximate cause 
of the accident. On the contrary, the complaint alleged 
that both the conduct of Cox and the conduct of Smith 
proximately caused the accident. The burden was 011 
defendant Smith to prove his contention that Cox's 
conduct was a superseding cause. He came forward 
ll'ith no eYidence on the point. There was no evidence 
as to how long a time elapsed between the Cox incident 
and the Klafta incident. Defendant must take the bitter 
1rith the sweet. If the complaint is to be taken as evi-
dence, it is to the effect that two causes, that of Smith 
and that of Cox proxi11.ately caused the accident. As a 
matter of fact, the pleadings were properly kept from 
the jury as e,·idence. Cox was never served, and his case 
was ne,·er before the court. 
As to what is a superseding cause that will relieve 
a wrongdoer of liability, Prosser on Torts, Second Edi-
tion, at page 267, states: 
"The question ahrnys is whether he is to be 
relie,·ed of responsibility, and his liability super-
seded, b~· the subsequent event. In general this 
has been determined by asking whether the inter-
vention of the other cause was a significant part 
of the hazard inYoh·ed in the defendant's conduct, 
or was reasonably eonnected with it. Sometimes 
1.'." 
the limita tio11 has been treated as one of for._ ~eeability; but it can scarcely be so defined. siii~e 
m many cases recovery has been allowed where 
the intervening cause was not one whieh anr 
reasona~le a~tor coul? !>e expected to auticipat; 
or have m mmd, but it 1s regarded as 'normal' to 
the situation he has in fact created. The pr~1ctitil', 
application of the distinctiou 11ndoubted!r 1i,11 
involved a considerable element of hindsight. 
Prosser also states at page 268: 
"Obviously the defendant cauuot be reliered 
from liability by the fact that the risk, or part of 
the risk, to which he has subjected the plaintiff 
has come to pass. Foreseeable intervening form 
are within the scope of the original risk, and hence 
of the defendant's negligence. The courts are 
quite generally agreed that such intenening 
causes will not supersede his responsibilit(' 
(Citing cases.) 
Prosser also discusses so-called "normal" iuterren-
ing causes in situations where the plaintiff could not 
reasonably foresee the intervening cause, but sueh rause 
is normal to the risk created and therefore not a super-
seding cause. At page 270 in Prosser on Torts. the 
following appears: 
"There are other intervening cnuses which : 
could scarcely have beeu contemplated by the , 
defendant at the time of his conduct, but wh1cl1 
are nevertheless to be regarded as normal inci-
dents of the risk he has created. 'Vhen the defeud· 
ant negliaently drives an automobile. he mn) 1 reasonabl~ for~see that he may run dmrn '1 1n:111 
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or collide with another car. It would be straining 
anticipation to the hreaking point to say that he 
should ha Ye in mind the possibility that the man 
might he left unconscious iu the highway, an<l 
ruu over by another car, or that the automobile 
might be left across the highway and cause a 
seeon<l collision. He might have even less reason 
to contemplate the possibility that if he en-
da11gered a child. a rescuer dashing out from the 
sidewalk might be injured. But such events are 
eertainh· not abnormal incidents of the situation 
in fact. created - the unconscious man, the 
bloekcd highwa~·. or the danger to the child. *** 
They are closelr and reasonably associated with 
tk immediate c:onsequences of the defendant's 
act. and to that extent may be regarded as within 
the scope of the risk created. For the most part 
the~· luffe been e:1 lied foreseeable by the courts." 
In discussiug foreseeable results of unforeseeable 
1·a11ses, the following appears at page 278 in Prosser on 
Torts: 
"Suppose that the defendant is negligent be-
cause his conduct threatens a result of a particu-
lar kind which will injure the plaintiff, and an 
interYe11ing cause which could not be anticipated 
changes the situation, but ultimately produces 
the same result? The problem is well illustr~ted 
by a well-known federal case. (Johnson v. 
Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 6 Cir. 1933, 64 
F.:!d 193). The defendant failed to clean the resi-
due out of an oil barge, tied to a dock, leaving 
it full of explosive gas. This was of course negli-
gence, since tire or explosion, resulting in harm 
to any person in the vicinity was to be anticipated 
from any one ot' several possible sources. A bolt 
nf lightning struek the barge, exploded the gas, 
l 'J 
an<l injured workmen on the premises. 'j'\ 11 
defendant was held liahle. If it be assumed tlw 
the lightning was an unforeseeable iuterrn1j11 ,, 
cause, still the result itself was to he anticipate,[ 
and the risk of it imposed upon the <lefendam 
the original rluty to use proper care . 
. "In such a cas:. the ~·esult is '~ithi11 .the seup: 
of the defendants negligence. His obliga[io11111 
the plaintiff was to protect him against tlie ml 
of such an accident. It is only a slight extension · 
of his responsibilit~· to hol<l him liable when t\11 1 
danger he has crea te<l is realized through extenwi 
factors which coulrl not be anticipated. An 111 
stinctive feeling of justice leads to the eondusi111 · 
that the defendant is morally responsible in suci, · 
a case, and that the loss should fall upon hun 
rather than upon the innocent plaintiff." 
The case of Wedel v. Johnson, et al, 1936 Minn 1 
496 Minn. 170, 264 N ·''r· G89, is a case with a simila1 
fact situation. In this case plaintiff sought to recorn 
for injuries sustained while driving his car on the l11gl1 
way at night when he collided with the carcass of a hoN 
It appeared the horse running at large on the highwa.1 . 
had been struck by a truck. The sheriff was notified ut • 
the presence of the carcass in the roadway, but befon' 
• I 
he had an opportunity to remove it, the accident imoh i 
ing plaintiff's car occurred. Plaintiff brought at:l1nn '. 
against the driver of the truck that killed the hor't 1 
against the owners of the truck who had permitted tht: 
driYer to use it for his own purposes, and against tlit 
1 
owner of the horse, alleging violation of the statu!c 
against allowing animals to run at large, and negligenrt' 
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'' ' 
iii permitting the horse to escape from its enclosure. 
Trial resulted iu a verdict for the plaintiff against all 
defendants. The defendants moved for judgment not-
11ithstancling the yerdict, or a new trial, and plaintiff 
.,1 111 rnovecl for a new trial on the ground of inadequate 
damages. Defendant's motions were denied, but plain-
1·1ff was granted a new trial on the issue of damages 
done. The appellate court ultimately absolved all de-
fendants except the horse owner and in regard to the 
horse owner's liability stated: 
"Without going into the evidence in detail*** 
a careful examiuation of the record discloses that 
the jury might well find that (defendant's) em-
ployees in charge of the horses at the fairgrounds, 
carelessly allowed them to escape and neglected 
to properly return them to control, and we think 
that under modern traffic conditions the jury 
might well find that a man of ordinary prudence 
would anticipate injury to some one from allow-
ing horses at large in the vicinity of highways. 
This would be particularly true at night. It does 
not greatly alter the situation that the horse was 
struck uu the highway by some other car. Such 
cullision would not be an efficient intervening 
1·a11se which would relieve (defendant) of liabilit,y. 
The body of the horse aliYe or dead was a menace 
to the highway traffic, and allowing the animal 
to run at large was a substantial factor and a 
material contribution to plaintiff's injury." 
The conduct of Cox, whether negligent or not, un-
1 rler the foregoing authorities could not be a superseding 
t: i·ause for the reason that the accident involving plaintiff 
21 
is the \·ery antieipatable result whieh moliYa ted tJ1e itgi 
lature in enacting the statute. 
The foregoing arg1111H::11t should not be taken :1111 
admission on plaintiff's part that the eomplaint 1 ,,~ 
admissible as a ju<lieial admission. \Ve deny that 111, 
is the case. On its face the eomplaint eo11trorert.1 I! 
eontention of defendant. The complaint alleges i1111" 
first cause of action that the negligence of Smith· 
proximately caused the injuries ... of which plaiuliii 
herein complains ... " The second ea use of action allegn 
Cox's negligenee " ... proximately caused the injur1t1 
... " And in the prayer plaintiff "prays judgmt11: 
against defendants and eaeh of them ... " 
Certainly the foregoing pleading could 11ot oe t:rkf 1 
as an admission that Cox's negligence supersede:1, 
Smith's negligence. 
In addition, it is settled law in Utah that an a11s11t1 
or other pleading which has not been superseded Ii)· a: 
amendment or substitution cannot be used as eride11r• 
for the jury by way of admissions without the consc11t 
of the parties; the effect and meaning of the plea<linµ· 
with respect to admissions being a question for the eourt 
See Toone v .• J. P. O'Neil Construction Co., ~o C.2fi.i 
121 P.10. 
OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT ROSE KLAFTA WAI 
HERSELF GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
There are two reasons why contributory neglig~nce 
· · · I t liar Fll'st. was not a proper .Jury issue m t 1e case a · 
71 
thi' 1rn.'i uol a ueglige11ec t'.asc. It was a statutory liability 
case. Conlributury ucglige11cc is 11ot a defense. 
Secoud, the evi<lu1cc does not reveal any act or 
omission 011 the part of llosc Klafta that could under 
am· stretch of imaginati011 be characterized as negli-
g·eure. The plaintiff testified that (R. 44): 
"Well, we "·ere just riding along the road. 
E\·crytbing \\:IS wiing fine. Then we come to this 
spot, something black laying there. There was 
nothing traveli11:~ in front of us. But this black 
objcd \ms there. "\11d my soil threw his arm up 
agai11st rue to hold me back when he applied his 
hrake rud hard a11d we hit some hard object. 
(~,Did .n'u ~;<~c this object ~-ourself on the high-
way? 
,\. "Te were .i u-;t a matter of feet. 
q, \\'hat ""ls "~1c appearance of iP 
,\. You could1d tell what it was. Some dark 
ob.ieet. . \ml I t lioug·ht it was like a tarpaulin or 
.~omcthiBg. I do1t't know. 
Q. Can you describe the color of this object 
iu contrast with tlte color of the highway? 
,\,\Veil. the objed was just pure black. 
(~. How about the highway1 
A. The hig·lnn1~· seemC'd awful dark, too." 
There was no evidence that the plaintiff saw or 
should lune see11 the animal in time to have warned or 
dniit a11ytliing at all. She tcstitied that when she first 
0aw the ohjc:d '"it was just :i matter of feet" before the 
r -·' 
impact. Defendant has the burden of proof m1 a matter 
of this kind. He did not sustaiu that burdell. 
Defendant's conteutiou that the jury shoul<l J11 
allowed to consider the fact that there were no seat belh 
as contributory negligence is supported b~, nothing but 
counsel's own wishful thinking. Defendallt ha., rited 
no authorities to sustain this novel principle. Ile at· 
tempts to tickle the imagination of this Honorable Court 
into a burst of interesting new law. A person imited 
to ride in a new Cadillac automobile should refuse to ride 
in same unless General :Motors has seen fit to equip it 
with seat belts. This is just another example of the 
man~' untenable positions which characterize defendant's 
brief. 
THOMPSON CASE DISTINGUISHED 
Defendant in his brief Las cited the recent l'tali 
case of Thornpson v. Ford Motor Co., U.2d . 295 i 
P.2d 62, as being determinatiYe of the questiou as to 
whether violation of the statute establishes negligence 
per se or liability. The case at bar is distinguishable 
from the 1.'hompson case, inasmuch as the statute here 
involved specifically establishes liabilitr where a pers1111 
is injured as a result of the statutor~' Yiolation. The 1 
plaintiff in the case at bar is within the dass of persons 
protected by the statute. In the 'Ph01npson case .. as 
pointed out, in Mr. Justice Henriocl's dissent, the plwn· 
ti.ff tl·as not within the class of persons under the profrt· 
tion of the stai'.11.Je. In addition, there wa~ a serious 0rn·1 
'.'. 1 
tiou as to whether or not the truck was unattended. The 
plaintiff claimed that it was not. There was also a serious 
question as to whether or not plaintiff's injuries were 
prnximatcly caused by the violation of the statute. Plain-
tiff has no argument with the fact that there are certain 
1tatutes, Yiolatiou of which establishes negligence per se, 
and which Yiolation can with a proper showing be ex-
nised. Howe\-er, the statute in question is not one of 
these statutes, inasmuch as it specifically imposes lia-
bility 011 the part of the violator. Defense counsel, in 
his brief. has dreamed up some hypothetical situations 
11hich he claims \\'ould make application of the doctrine 
uf absolute liability uutenable. However, these hypo-
thetical situations do uot contain the facts of the case at 
bar. The solution of different cases with different prob-
lems lea\'es us still facing the problem now before the 
, court. Let us discuss this problem and worry about light-
. ning, Hoods, and hurricanes when, as, and if they occur. 
i Here the defendant was hauling cattle and a separation 
of the tailgate from the side of the rack caused the cattle 
lo fall u11to the highway. As was pointed out by Bur-
dick, Law of Crime, knowledge is not an element of 
proof in such a statute. The falling of the object from 
lht truck eonstitutes the violation. Counsel for defend-
1 ~nt thinks the humanitarian thing to do is to place the 
burden of loss on the shoulders of an innocent victim 
and give sympathetic relief to the hauler for profit who 
rlropped his cow into the path of lawful travelers on the 
l1ig'hlrny. H umanitaria11 indeed! 
CONCLUSION 
At common law drivers 011 a public highway mre 
a duty of exercising onhuary care to keep their haulaue 
from falling onto the highway an<l causing injurr ~o 
travelers lawfully using same. The Utah Legish;ture 
saw fit to pass a statute imposing a more stringent duty 
on those who would use our highways to haul product1 
and commodities. An innocent passenger suffered serere 
permanent injury as a result of a black cow falling from 
a truck onto the highway at night. Her case has been 
tried before two juries. Each time, the matter was Yiewed 
as some hybrid type of negligence action, contran· to 
the unequiYocal language of the statute. The ease obri· 
ously must be tried a third time because the jury incon· 
sistently answered that there was no Yiolation of the 
statute but that a violation of the statute proximately 
caused plaintiff's injury. The trial court, recognizing 
that the evidence undisputedly was that defendant's 
eow fell onto the highway and caused plaintiff's injury 
granted judgment N.O.Y. Because the jury refused 
to award general damages e1·en though plaintiff hadsuf· 
f ered a fractured back, it becomes necessary to try the 
case again on the issue of damages. 
The ruling of the trial court is just and fair. Our 
statutory law must be honored just as our decisional 
law must be honored. 
"re respectfully submit that the trial court's ruling 
should be sustained. 
Respectfull~· submitted, 
RAvVLINGS, "\\._.\LLACE, ROBERTS 
& BLACK 
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